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Article: 
 
This special issue (short: S.I.) is dedicated to the study of philosophical methodology. Until 
recently, the debate about philosophical methods in analytic philosophy primarily focused on the 
method of conceptual analysis, linguistic intuitions, thought experiments, and empirical methods. 
The result of an analysis of a concept is typically taken to be an explicit definition that consists 
of a list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for its fulfillment. Yet, such a 
list is only a result of a conceptual analysis if it is true by virtue of the meaning of its parts and if 
this truth can be recognized a priori with the aid of linguistic intuitions (e.g., Grice 1958). We 
can test definitions by conducting thought experiments that enact the specified conditions (e.g., 
Mach 1973; Jackson 1998, ch. 2; Nimtz 2012). This method of conceptual clarification has been 
criticized in several respects. For instance, Willard van Orman Quine challenged one of its 
presuppositions, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction (Quine 1951). Hilary Kornblith argued 
that its aim of specifying individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition cannot be 
reached (Kornblith 2007; see also Chalmers and Jackson 2001). Longstanding debates about 
concepts like knowledge are thus rather a gimmick than fruitful philosophical work (Kornblith 
2014). Lynne Rudder Baker aimed to show that empirical considerations are involved in 
seemingly a priori analyses (Rudder Baker 2001), and it has been debated whether conceptual 
analysis is knowledge expanding (for this debate see, e.g., Balcerak Jackson and Balcerak 
Jackson 2012; Balcerak Jackson 2013). In recent years, it has also been argued that conceptual 
analysis should not be carried out by individual philosophers. Instead, folk intuitions need to be 
elicited by means of quantitative research. Such arguments led to the rise of so-called 
experimental philosophy (e.g., Knobe and Nichols 2008; Horvath and Grundmann 2012), and to 
even more debates about the nature of conceptual analysis (e.g., Nimtz 2012), the role of thought 
experiments within it (e.g., Williamson 2007; Nimtz 2010; Malmgren 2011; Grundmann and 
Horvath 2014), the epistemic status of counterfactual conditionals, which are central for the latter 
(e.g., Williamson 2007), and about the notion of conceptual truth (e.g., Nimtz 2009). 
 
The S.I. at hand supplements this debate about philosophical methodology by placing emphasis 
on other methods and debates. Its focus is on explication, conceptual (re-)engineering, the 
application of formal methods, and other methodological considerations that are central for 
philosophical practice and have not received enough attention in the literature. A common 
feature of many methods that are discussed in this S.I. is the sharpening of concepts. Rudolf 
Carnap (1950) coined the method of explication. He suggested to replace the concept of interest, 
the explicandum, with a similar explicatum, which needs to be fruitful, simple, and exact. In 
contrast to conceptual analysis, not all uses of the concept need to be captured. Instead, 
problematic uses are meant to be excluded when specifying the explicatum. Quine demanded 
that explication should replace conceptual analysis in many parts of philosophy (Quine 1960). 
However, apart from a brief debate between Strawson (1963) and Carnap (1963), the method of 
explication was only sparsely employed (Hanna 1968; Craig 1990; Boniolo 2003; Maher 2007) 
until recently. Within the past couple of years, however, its popularity rose (e.g., Brun 2016), 
especially within epistemology (e.g., Brendel 2013; Olsson 2015; Eder ms.) and philosophy of 
science (e.g., Schupbach and Sprenger 2011; Justus 2012; van Riel 2014; Schupbach 2017). 
Some philosophers (e.g., Brun 2016) consider Carnapian explication to be a method among a 
broader family of method that recently gained more interest, namely so-called conceptual  
(re-)engineering, whose aim is to redefine concepts or even to introduce new ones for particular 
purposes. This ameliorative method is concerned with how a concept should function (e.g., 
Haslanger 2000; Burgess and Plunkett 2013; Fassio and McKenna 2015). Conceptual  
(re-)engineering has been applied in recent philosophy with the purpose to change society. 
Examples are the re-engineering of the concepts of race and of gender (e.g., Haslanger 2012). 
Prima facie, Carnapian explication and conceptual (re-)engineering resemble the use of formal 
methods to clarify concepts, such as the concept of (degrees of) belief (e.g., Huber and Schmidt-
Petri 2009; Spohn 2012; Leitgeb 2013, 2014, 2015), coherence (e.g., Bovens and Hartmann 
2003; Olsson 2005), confirmation (e.g., Earman 1992), or causality (e.g., Pearl 2000). As in the 
case of explication, not all uses of the concept in question are meant to be captured and the 
resulting definitions should be fruitful, simple, and exact. 
 
Reflections on these less discussed philosophical methods are of fundamental importance for 
many debates taking place in contemporary philosophy, such as the debate about ameliorative 
projects within social and political philosophy, the knowledge-first approach in epistemology, 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction in the philosophy of language, and the distinction between 
verbal vs. non-verbal disagreement as well as the debate about armchair philosophy in 
philosophy in general. The S.I. contains 12 papers that provide new thought-provoking proposals 
for these debates. 
 
The first six papers of this S.I. investigate the method of Carnapian explication, by offering 
reconstructions of Carnap’s account of explication or by comparing it to related methods and 
addressing some of the criticisms that have been raised against it. 
 
Georg Brun’s paper “Conceptual Re-Engineering: From Explication to Reflective Equilibrium” 
deals with two prominent philosophical methods: Carnapian explication and the equally well-
known method of reflective equilibrium as developed by Nelson Goodman. Brun focuses on 
unappreciated relations between Carnap’s method and Goodman’s theory of constructive 
definitions and his account of reflective equilibrium, which, as he shows, can also be understood 
as a method of conceptual engineering. In his instructive paper, Brun investigates the historical 
and structural relations between those methods and argues that they can be understood “as 
aspects of one method” that contributes to theory development in philosophy as well as in 
science. Brun considers Goodman’s method of reflective equilibrium to be a “further 
development” of Carnap’s explication. He argues for three main points: (i) conceptual re-
engineering should deal with sets of concepts and theories rather than focus on single concepts, 
(ii) it should be conceived of as a method of mutual adjustments, which (iii) are guided by 
adequacy requirements analogous to those of Carnapian explication. 
 
Mark Pinder’s contribution “On Strawson’s Critique of Explication as a Method in Philosophy” 
explores the limits and prospects of the method of explication as coined by Rudolf Carnap. He 
does so by thoroughly discussing P.F. Strawson’s famous criticism of it (which is also addressed 
in Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s and Eve Kitsik’s contribution to this S.I.). As is well-known, 
Carnapian explication is a method of conceptual clarification that replaces an imprecise 
concept—mostly from everyday language—by a concept that satisfies the adequacy 
requirements of being more precise, yet similar in use, fruitful and simple. It does not need to be 
maximally similar. Strawson’s criticism of this method is commonly conceived of as a criticism 
of the philosophical usefulness of such a method of explication. According to Pinder, the 
criticism is considered to be that, when it comes to philosophical problems, the method of 
explication serves only to change the subject—rather than to solve the problem. It does so by 
simply replacing a concept central to the problem in question by a more precise technical 
concept that is not central to it. Pinder argues that this understanding of Strawson’s criticism is 
not warranted in its full generality. He argues that whether the method of explication can 
contribute to solving a particular philosophical problem depends on the purpose of the 
explication in question, how the particular problem is construed, and the elaboration of the 
explication 
 
In “The Constituents of an Explication” Moritz Cordes develops a formal reconstruction of the 
explication relation, building on previous work by Siegwart (1997a, b). Taking explicata to be 
terms, rather than concepts, he argues that explication is a relation among expressions (the 
explicandum and the explicatum), each of which is part of a language (the explicandum and the 
explicatum language), a set of criteria of adequacy, and an explicative introduction (intuitively, 
the characterization of the explicatum). Each of these six constituents is defined in a purely 
formal way. Based on these six constituents of an explication, Cordes identifies four different 
types of explication alternatives—four types of pairs of explications of the same explicandum, 
whose members differ in various respects (for instance, they may be equivalent with respect to 
the criteria of adequacy identified while different with respect to the explicative introduction). 
Cordes’ enterprise can be characterized as an explication of explication; and he picks up this idea 
in the last section of his paper, applying the apparatus developed in the previous section to his 
own proposal. 
 
Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s contribution focuses on the revisionary character of Carnapian 
explication. In “Carnapian Explication and Ameliorative Analysis: A Systematic Comparison”, 
she investigates similarities and differences between Carnap’s method of explication and Sally 
Haslanger’s method of ameliorative analysis, which is also revisionary in nature. Dutilh Novaes 
focuses on the importance of the methods of explication and of ameliorative analysis for political 
and social life and claims that both can contribute to social reforms—which might seem 
surprising, especially in the case of Carnapian explication. As Dutilh Novaes instructively 
displays, both methods are influenced by different philosophical schools and were introduced 
with different agendas. Carnap’s method of explication is influenced by his view on rational 
scientific practice and rational theory formation in science, which traces back to the Vienna 
Circle. Its significance for social change may not be immediately evident. Haslanger’s method, 
in contrast, is influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Dutilh Novaes not only 
explores the historical relations of both methods but also compares both methods with respect to 
the above mentioned change in subject objection (which is also addresses by Mark Pinder and 
Eve Kitsik in this S.I.) and with respect to their adequacy requirements. Finally, she shows that 
both methods are complementary and can benefit from each other. 
 
Whereas Dutilh Novaes discusses the importance of explication and ameliorative projects for 
non-theoretical purposes, Eve Kitsik focuses on explication and its significance for the 
clarification of central concepts and positions in theoretical philosophy. In her contribution 
“Explication as a Strategy for Revisionary Philosophy”, she too shows that Carnapian 
explication can play a central role for revisionary philosophy. According to Kitsik, revisionary 
philosophy is concerned with the project of challenging beliefs that philosophers are very 
confident of. This project is motivated by the fact that some beliefs that initially seem very 
plausible can turn out to be implausible when their content is investigated more thoroughly. She 
focuses on two revisionary projects: revisionary ontology and radical skepticism. Kitsik argues 
that philosophers engaged with such projects should make it explicit that they depart from the 
everyday use of “Fs exist” and “S knows that p”, respectively. Such departure, however, faces 
two main worries—the unintelligibility worry and the aforementioned topic shift worry, 
or change in subject objection. Roughly, according to the unintelligibility worry, if the use of 
philosophical notions or claims departs from the everyday use of them, then their “philosophical 
counterparts” are not intelligible. According to the topic shift worry, a departure from everyday 
use of notions such as “Fs exist” and “S knows that p” changes the topic and does not address 
original worries. Kitsik discusses the worries in detail and alleviates them. According to Kitsik, 
questions and objections can be adequate in philosophical contexts that would be inadequate in 
everyday contexts. One reason for this is that in philosophical contexts the purpose is to achieve 
epistemic excellence, which is a more demanding purpose than is commonly aimed for in 
everyday contexts. 
 
Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna discuss a related method in “The Genealogical Method in 
Epistemology”. They defend Edward Craig’s genealogical approach to an analysis of knowledge 
against objections. Craig himself believed his method to be linked to Carnapian explication 
(Craig 1987). On Craig’s view, identifying a function of the use of ‘knowledge’ in a state of 
nature and constructing, from there, a genealogical story which leads to an understanding of 
‘knowledge’, will benefit our philosophical understanding of ‘knowledge’, without relying on an 
analysis of the concept, in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. The 
objections Kusch and McKenna discuss are divided into four groups. The first concerns the 
details of Craig’s approach: that it (i) fails to identify the main function of knowledge ascriptions 
in general, or that it (ii) does not adequately address the various functions paradigmatic 
knowledge ascriptions may serve. The second group concern alleged methodological problems: 
that (iii) Craig focuses on a social kind, whereas any such project should focus on a natural kind 
of knowledge, provided not in the sociology of knowledge but in cognitive ethology, that (iv) 
Craig commits to problematic accounts of knowledge when suggesting that true belief is more 
fundamental than knowledge. The third kind of objection directly targets the genealogical 
method – that it is a purely fictional just so story whose alleged explanatory power is highly 
questionable (v). The final two objections concern consequences of Craig’s approach regarding 
possible normative implications of contextualism and relativism (vi, vii). 
 
The following four papers focus on various aspects of the peculiarities of philosophical 
investigations that are somehow related to the armchair: philosophical expertise, armchair 
philosophy and its relation to methodological naturalism, and the a priori/a posteriori distinction. 
 
In their paper “Philosophical Expertise Under the Microscope” Miguel Egler and Lewis Ross 
provide a new version of the so-called expertise defense in favor of armchair philosophy. In a 
nutshell, the argument is that philosophers’ reliance on intuitions in their reasoning is vindicated 
by their expertise. Egler and Ross’ version draws on a more fine-grained analysis of 
philosophical expertise. There are different methodological practices in philosophy, such as 
different uses of thought experiments, and thus different kinds of philosophical expertise. Each 
of these must be considered individually. Yet, either way, it is not the expertise of intuitions that 
vindicates their use but the expertise in philosophical practices. Egler and Ross illustrate their 
‘piecemeal’ version of the expertise defense with the example of ordinary language philosophy. 
 
Sebastian Lutz, in his paper “Armchair Philosophy Naturalized”, explores, first, the question of 
how conceptual engineering in philosophy relates to practices in the sciences, and suggests, 
second, some general conclusions about the synthetic/a priori distinction and its role in 
philosophy. In a nutshell, Lutz argues that a considerable part of the sciences is concerned with 
conceptual matters (analytic or conventional) and that, as a consequence, the naturalist, whose 
main contention is that philosophy should resemble the sciences in its methodology, need not 
require philosophy to abandon its well-established procedures of conceptual clarification or 
engineering. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that philosophy is continuous with the sciences 
in precisely this respect. The discussion is framed in terms of Carnapian explication, and can be 
regarded as a defense of both, Carnapian armchair philosophy and conceptual engineering (à la 
Carnap) in the sciences against criticisms raised by William Demopoulos, David Papineau and 
Willard Van Orman Quine. 
 
Daniele Sgaravatti’s aim in his paper “Experience and Reasoning: Challenging the A Priori/A 
Posteriori Distinction” is to expand upon an argument by Timothy Williamson against the 
significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. It is commonly assumed that knowledge is a 
priori when it is independent of experience, where knowledge is a posteriori when it depends on 
experience. Sgaravatti focuses on examining the nature of the dependencies in question. He aims 
to show that there is no characterization of said dependencies that would allow to draw the a 
priori/a posteriori distinction in a satisfying way. Either the characterizations do not allow for a 
priori knowledge or they lead to classifying paradigmatic instances of a priori beliefs as a 
posteriori beliefs or, on the opposite side, they classify too many beliefs as a priori. Sgaravatti 
illustrates this argument and defends it against objections. His diagnosis for the issue is that the 
role of experience in reasoning is neither purely enabling nor purely evidential. Reasoning skills 
are dependent on experience for their normative value. Their normative status depends on the 
experiences that constitute their acquisition and development. 
 
In his paper “On Question-Begging and Analytic Content”, Samuel Elgin is concerned with the 
clarification of the concept of question begging arguments. He clarifies the concept in terms 
of analytic content illustrated by some cases: An argument begs the question just in case its 
conclusion is part of the analytic content of the conjunction of its premises. Thereby, not all valid 
arguments beg the question. Analytic truth and analytic containment is understood roughly along 
Fregean lines. Elgin’s answer to the question of what goes epistemically wrong with question 
begging arguments is that one cannot use the premises to gain knowledge of the conclusion: It is 
impossible to know that the conjunction of the premises is true without knowing that the 
conclusion is true—provided that knowledge is closed under analytic parthood. 
 
The remaining two papers discuss topics in (meta-)metaphysics: something-from-nothing 
derivations, and the question if, and if so in which sense, metaphysical disputes are merely 
verbal. 
 
Alex Steinberg, in his “Pleonastic Propositions and the Face Value Theory”, deals with a recent 
realist response to nominalist doubts concerning the existence of abstract objects: pleonasticism. 
He discusses Stephen Schiffer’s pleonastic theory of propositions, according to which: 
propositions (i) are derivative, ‘pleonastic’ objects, and (ii) are referred to in propositional 
attitude ascriptions (the face value theory). Steinberg argues that (i) and (ii) generate a tension: if 
propositions are pleonastic, we should expect substantive truths about them to derive from 
unproblematic truths about non-pleonastic objects. But if attitude ascriptions already treat of 
propositions, substantive truths concerning which propositions are the contents of which attitudes 
(content ascriptions) have no obvious grounds in the non-pleonastic. Steinberg suggests that we 
should give up part (ii) of the account of propositions in response to the difficulty. In a first step, 
Steinberg argues that the main argument in favor of the face-value theory, which is based on the 
observation that we can quantify into the position of ‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions, is not 
decisive, since we can quantify into verb phrase and adjectival positions as well. Steinberg then 
shows how dropping the assumption dissolves the tension in the resulting theory: if (ii) is denied, 
we are free to claim that content ascriptions derive from propositional attitude ascriptions, which, 
crucially, are themselves ontologically innocent. Steinberg ends by arguing that this suggestion 
also explains some peculiarities noted by Schiffer of the alleged proposition designators that 
occur in propositional attitude ascriptions. 
 
In his paper “Why Metaphysical Debates are Not Merely Verbal (Or How to Have a Non-Verbal 
Metaphysical Debate)”, Mark Balaguer tackles the question of whether particular metaphysical 
debates are merely verbal, such as debates about the existence of objects in the past. His main 
thesis is that none of these debates are, in principle, merely verbal. The key element of a merely 
verbal dispute is that the meaning of a core notion is understood differently by the participants. 
Taking the different meanings into account, the disagreement typically dissolves. Balaguer boils 
down the question at stake to the question of whether the metaphysical questions that drive the 
respective disputes can be, in principle, non-merely verbally debated. Employing a taxonomy of 
different kinds of metaphysical views, he then argues by means of an example that any of the 
debates in question allows for non-verbal debates if certain conditions are fulfilled, and he 
defends his argument against objections. One crucial condition is that the debate needs to be 
carried out in a language that has a thick semantics, i.e., a semantics that says that the sentences 
whose truth values are being debated have metaphysically weighty truth conditions–in other 
words, a semantics that says that the sentences in question could be true only if the relevant 
controversial metaphysical theory is true. 
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